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James Lind and the Disclosure of Failure 
 
The James Lind Library, an online repository of documents pertaining to the 
history and design of the clinical trial, records a number of cases in which a critic of 
the institution of medicine challenges the profession to a test of rival treatments.  It 
was in this spirit that Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753) dared physicians to test their 
treatments for smallpox against his favored remedy, tar-water, under similar 
conditions.  Like several other proposed trials of which we have a record, the 
tournament envisioned by Berkeley never took place.  In the year of Berkeley’s 
death, however, the world learned of an actual test of rival treatments under 
controlled conditions that had gone unreported and therefore unnoticed for half a 
decade. 
This historic trial was conducted by James Lind (1716-94) in 1747 aboard 
HSM Salisbury in the English Channel.  With scurvy already afflicting a ship out of 
port only a few weeks, Lind chose twelve patients ‘whose cases were as similar as I 
could have them’, divided them into pairs, and administered to each pair a possible 
treatment for the dreaded disease.  Only the pair treated with oranges and lemons 
improved, even though the fruit supply ran out after six days.  
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 Noteworthy in retrospect, Lind’s trial was a non-event in its own time.  
Though its verdict in favour of citrus fruit agreed with what was already common 
maritime knowledge, Lind never followed up on it and never campaigned for 
controlled trials as a method of medical discovery.  (After all, others had much to 
learn from his careful effort to hold experimental conditions constant.)  In fact, after 
recounting the trial in the middle of his weighty Treatise on the Scurvy, Lind never 
mentions it again, and a quarter century later, in the Postscript to the third and final 
edition of the Treatise, he writes as if it never took place, concluding that scurvy has 
no definitive remedy, yields to ‘very opposite methods of cure’ and poses an enigma 
to medicine.  In many cases, he observes, scurvy has such a grip on patients that it 
becomes ‘a lasting affliction to them during a great part of their lives’—a chronic 
disease.  In the Advertisement to the third edition he concedes, too, that the Treatise 
as it stands is marred by ‘several seeming contradictions, which could not easily be 
avoided’.  Far from claiming the honour of establishing a model of clinical 
investigation, he admits defeat, saying that he has reached a point where he can ‘can 
carry my researches no further’.1 
While the ready explanation for Lind’s failure—that he got lost in the 
vapours of his own theories2—has some truth, it’s also true that Lind was explicitly 
skeptical of theory and esteemed observation over intellectual guesswork.3  (‘Too 
high an opinion has been entertained of certain medicines [for scurvy] 
recommended by physicians at land, rather from a presumption founded on their 
theory of the disease, than from any experience of their effects at sea.’)  Lind 
probably interpreted the Salisbury trial as suggestive rather than probative, and it 
 3 
may be that his belief in the efficacy of citrus (never absolute in the first place) 
weakened in later years because much of the scurvy he saw in Haslar hospital was 
hopelessly confounded with other diseases, or because he unwittingly destroyed 
vitamin C in the course of preparing his preferred remedy, a fruit concentrate 
known as ‘rob’.  In any case, scurvy as Lind observed it over the years challenged 
understanding, sometimes resolving with no change of diet or regimen, sometimes 
breaking out in those who eat a good diet and breathe good air.  Moreover, in ‘at 
least’ ten or twelve percent of the cases seen by Lind at Haslar hospital, the disease 
proved stubborn, demanding not only dietary but medical treatment for weeks at a 
time, ‘at the expiration of which, the injury done to the constitution was in many far 
from being removed’.  
Unbeknownst to Lind, scurvy—a specific disease with a specific cure—lent 
itself perfectly to a clinical trial.  That trials on less distinct and less treatable 
diseases would have advanced medicine seems doubtful.  But what good would 
trials have done if unwanted outcomes could be buried in silence, as was the 
custom?  Early proponents of clinical trials, from Petrarch to Van Helmont, from 
Bishop Berkeley to Mesmer, dreamed of public tournaments in which orthodox 
medicine would be put to shame.  In the real world, rarely does medical 
investigation take place in such a public manner.  Unlike doctors participating in a 
dramatic contest whose results play out for all to see, investigators in Lind’s world 
were free to conceal adverse outcomes.  Such a practice appeals directly to our bias 
in favour of positive findings as described by Francis Bacon: ‘it is a proper and 
perpetual error in Humane Understanding, to be rather moved and stirred up by 
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affirmatives than by negatives, although in truth it ought to be indifferent to both.’4  
At this point the high importance of Lind’s ethos of candour comes into focus. 
 Arguably, nothing but such an ethos could break through the robust practice 
of promoting ‘effective’ remedies by suppressing the record of their failures.  As 
Ulrich Tröhler has shown, contemporaries of Lind who published statistical 
comparisons of rival medical methods breathed life into the concept of evidence 
itself by challenging that practice.  One of their number, Robert Robertson, to whom 
Lind stood as a mentor, went so far as to document his own unsuccessful treatment 
of fevers in private practice, with great loss of life.5  Other reformers objected in so 
many words to the concealment of failures, and in so doing they followed Lind, 
whose highest praise was for authors ‘of great candour and veracity’ and whose 
Treatise constitutes a unique tale of failure.  ‘Lind, unlike . . . contemporary 
physicians then writing about scurvy, did not deliberately conceal evidence that ran 
counter to his own theories and observations.’6 
Such candour was all the more crucial in that the practice of denying failure 
had deep roots.  Even if a doctor rather than chance alone achieves a cure, wrote 
Montaigne in the latter 16th century, ‘how many times was it repeated?’7 The 
implication seems to be that we will never really know, because doctors don’t let us 
in on their failures.  Competing for credit as they do, why would they discuss 
failures?  In Montaigne’s time, even as the era of exploration became the era of 
scurvy, ‘published case histories . . . often served quite unabashedly to show off the 
physician’s particular expertise and his skill in arriving at an unexpected 
explanation.  Negative outcomes are rare and diagnostic or therapeutic errors on 
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the physician’s part virtually non-existent.’8  And this tradition of medical 
advertising, which impeded the conquest of failure because it blocked the 
recognition that failure has occurred, continued into Lind’s time.  The Navy’s Sick 
and Hurt Board itself was pestered with immodest proposals for scurvy-remedies.9   
One reason the Admiralty was slow to provision British ships with lemons is that its 
interest fastened onto a diligently promoted rival, malt (‘wort’).  The darling project 
of Lind’s contemporary, the physician David Macbride, wort theoretically cured a 
disease of defective fermentation by promoting the fermentation process in the 
body.  However, any report from the sea that wort actually prevented or cured 
scurvy could only have been based on confusion, a willful erasure of the evidence of 
inefficacy, or both. 
There are good reasons why it was scurvy that called forth Lind’s confession 
of failure.  He admitted that scurvy eluded his mastery and understanding because 
he couldn’t pretend otherwise.  The plague of the sea, scurvy took a fearful human 
toll and struck at the root of maritime power itself: the human beings who manned 
the ships.  According to an account of Lord Anson’s voyage excerpted by Lind, by the 
time the Gloucester reached the islands of Juan Fernandez (off the coast of Chile), it 
had lost three quarters of its crew to scurvy.  The Centurion buried 292 of its 
original complement of 506.  Such a scourge cried out for a remedy.  In a memo to 
the Admiralty Gilbert Blane—physician to the West Indies fleet and a friend and 
disciple of Lind—pronounced oranges, lemons and limes an ‘infallible’ cure as well 
as preventive of scurvy.10  Lind, who never believed scurvy had one and only one 
cause, found no treatment infallible, and what he saw or thought he saw at Haslar 
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hospital of the disease’s behavior persuaded him that scurvy defeated the medical 
knowledge available to him.  Not the acceptance of failure but belief in a remedy 
exempt from failure endangers the public good.  ‘It is perhaps the vain and 
chimerical belief of the existence of a never failing remedy for most diseases, which 
occasions the quick disgust which is conceived to medicine at every disappointment, 
and the daily attempts at new methods of cure, which has rendered the art of 
healing as variable and unconstant as our dresses.’ 
In the years after the publication of the final edition Lind’s treatise, when 
quantifiers began to call for the accurate tabulation of medical outcomes (failures 
and all), a spirit of medical candour was in the air.  Lind helped put it there.  While 
such candour is certainly in the spirit of the Enlightenment and drew strength from 
that international movement, at least one of Lind’s models of veracity precedes the 
18th century.  As part of his review of the scurvy literature, Lind reproduces at some 
length the eye-witness account by the physician Frederic Vander Mye of the siege of 
the city of Breda in 1625, in the course of which scurvy broke out.  As a desperate 
ruse, the Prince of Orange let it be known that he was coming to the beleaguered 
soldiers’ rescue by sending them a medicine ‘of great price, but still of greater 
efficacy’.  Three small vials were delivered, ‘not enough for the recovery of two 
patients’.  As a vehicle for ‘the Prince’s cure’ (as it came to be called) and other 
makeshift medicines, the physicians prepared brews of herbs that ‘now began to 
spring up above the ground’.  The result of this orchestrated hoax was that despair 
was routed and ‘many were quickly and perfectly recovered’—at least until scurvy  
flared up again, with lethal effect.  Just one month after the Prince’s miraculous 
 7 
intervention, the city surrendered.  (Characteristically, Lind wonders if the apparent 
recoveries could have been due to the antiscorbutic effect of the herbs used by the 
physicians to concoct their brews.)   
Here then is another parable of failure.  Indeed, Vander Mye’s depiction of 
scurvy’s behavior anticipates to some degree Lind’s concept of the disease.  Lind too 
finds that mental state has much to do with scurvy, such that dejection and 
melancholy predispose to it and cheerfulness guards against it.  In the spirit of the 
Prince of Orange, Lind has used ‘the most trifling prescriptions’ to relieve scurvy, 
but while he has been able to give relief to some (not all) of the patients thus 
treated, he has also found that the disease itself persists.  As in the story of Breda, 
Lind came to believe that the impression that we have solved or defeated scurvy is 
highly misleading—a mental mirage.  
The story of the Prince’s cure as relayed by Lind seems to have made a strong 
impression on some of his readers.  William Falconer in his Dissertation on the 
Influence of the Passions upon the Disorders of the Body (1788) reproduces the 
account of the intervention of the Prince as well as Lind’s comments on ‘the passions 
of the mind’ and attestation of Vander Mye’s truthfulness.  Yet Falconer fails to 
mention that scurvy had the last word at Breda; he leaves the impression that the 
charade of medical activity acted so powerfully on the imagination of the scurvy-
stricken soldiers that they rose from their sick-beds and walked away from the 
disease itself.  Elsewhere, however, Falconer objects to the practice of concealing 
failure.  In his treatise on the medicinal value of Bath waters, he censures the 
‘suppression of unfavourable events and circumstances’ in promotional literature.  
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Keenly aware of the unreliability of his knowledge, he is willing to say only that in 
many cases ‘a cautious trial’ of the waters is warranted.11  
Lind’s quoted account the Prince’s cure re-appears in a historic pamphlet 
published in 1800 by John Haygarth.  The tract in question, Of the Imagination as a 
Cause and as a Cure of Disorders of the Body, exposes the nullity of the then-popular 
Perkins ‘tractor’ by showing that patients tended to respond to a wooden replica 
just as they did to the genuine article—a modest instrument purportedly capable of 
removing pains from the body by the power of animal electricity.  In confirmation of 
the surprising effects of the imagination on the body, Haygarth quotes the Breda 
episode from Lind’s treatise, along with Lind’s comments on it.  Like Falconer, 
Haygarth for some reason neglects to mention that the Prince’s cure didn’t prevent 
the soldiers of Breda from succumbing en masse to scurvy in short order—an 
omission all the more surprising in that Haygarth goes on to comment that ‘I have 
sometimes observed that the administration of a new medicine. . . has been attended 
with great success—much greater than what was confirmed by future experience.’  
That is just what happened in Breda.  Like Falconer, too, Haygarth specifically 
objects to the concealment of failure in medical propaganda.  (Significantly, in the 
report of his own trial four—not five—out of five subjects responded to a wooden 
instrument.)  In publicity for the Perkins tractor itself, ‘cases which have been 
published are selected from many which were unsuccessful.’12  Even an article as 
worthless as the Perkins tractor can be made to seem superbly effective if the ‘cures’ 
it produces by coincidence or the placebo effect are celebrated and its failures 
hushed. 
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In their disapproval of selective publication Falconer and Haygarth were not 
alone.  Those who sought to reform medicine by the use of comparative statistics 
demanded accurate accounting, which in turn prohibits the concealment of adverse 
outcomes.  The firebrand and first president of the London Medical Society, John 
Millar, maintained that ‘by recording every case in a public and extensive practice, 
and comparing the success of various methods of cure, some useful information may 
be obtained.’13  Robert Robertson, who like Lind began in the Navy as a surgeon’s 
mate, published a detailed medical log of three journeys of HMS Rainbow in the 
1770’s, beginning with the case of a sailor treated unsuccessfully for intermittent 
fever—the first of many documented failures.  Robertson cites Lind at many points, 
mentions meeting him to discuss the preventive use of Peruvian bark, and 
incidentally recounts a scurvy trial modeled on Lind’s, which yields a result in favor 
of bark, not lime juice as we might have expected.14  States William Withering in a 
classic study of digitalis printed a few years later, ‘It would have been an easy task to 
have given select cases, whose successful treatment would have spoken in favour of 
the medicine [foxglove], and perhaps been flattering to my own reputation.  But 
Truth and Science would condemn the procedure.  I have therefore mentioned every 
case in which I have prescribed Foxglove, proper or improper, successful or 
otherwise.’15  None of these works precedes publication of the final edition of Lind’s 
treatise, crowned with the admission of defeat. 
The unfortunate tradition of proclaiming success while burying failure 
carried into our own era.  In 1981 a critic of medicine’s evidence-base pointed out 
that ‘Medical journals, along with those in other fields, tend to publish only reports 
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of “successful” interventions.  One seldom reads of unsuccessful interventions, even 
though their frequency may be equal to, and probably greater than, those purported 
to be successful.’16  The institution of the randomized clinical trial was supposed to 
settle medicine on a better evidentiary foundation than the tradition of ‘reports’ 
could possibly provide.  However, the evidence from RCT’s is only as good as its 
publication, and few would now dispute that the medical literature has been 
distorted by the practice of selective publication.   
Approximately 50% of randomized trials now go unpublished, presumably 
because they yielded the wrong result.  Comments the source of this statistic, ‘With 
many powerful academicians, lobbyists, professional societies, funding agencies, 
and perhaps even regulators shifting away from trials to observational data, even 
for licensing purposes, clinical medicine may be marching headlong to a massive 
suicide of its scientific evidence basis.  We may experience a return to the 18th 
century, before the first controlled trial on scurvy.’17  But the scurvy trial changed 
nothing.  What the times called for was the disclosure of failure, and this Lind 
encouraged not by oratory but the power of example.  The concealment of trial data 
today not only distorts calculations of harm and benefit but subverts the practice 
that first enabled medicine to portray itself credibly as a progressive body of 
knowledge.  
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